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Golden ticket attack

Concept

A golden ticket attack forges Kerberos ticket-granting tickets with a stolen KRBTGT key, giving an attacker persistent, arbitrary identity in an Active Directory domain.

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Title graphic: Golden ticket attack (Concept)

Description

A golden ticket attack is a technique in which an adversary forges Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGTs) after obtaining the password hash of the KRBTGT account in an Active Directory domain. MITRE ATT&CK catalogs it as sub-technique T1558.001, "Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Golden Ticket", under the credential access tactic on Windows. The KRBTGT account is the service account of the key distribution center (KDC), and its key is used to encrypt and sign all Kerberos tickets in the domain. Whoever holds that key can produce tickets that the domain treats as genuine.

The practical effect is persistent, arbitrary identity. With a forged TGT, an attacker can obtain authentication material for any account in Active Directory, which in turn allows access to resources across the network. One M365.FM episode describes this as a method that lets attackers create forged Kerberos tickets and access resources within the network without detection. The forged ticket still has to be presented to the KDC to request service tickets for specific resources, so the attack does not bypass the KDC entirely; it abuses the trust the KDC places in tickets signed with the KRBTGT key.

Obtaining the KRBTGT hash is the prerequisite. According to the MITRE ATT&CK description, the hash is typically gathered through OS credential dumping, which requires privileged access to a domain controller. This means a golden ticket is usually a post-compromise technique: an attacker who has already gained high privileges uses it to keep access and to impersonate accounts. Tools and groups listed as having forged golden tickets include Empire, Mimikatz, Rubeus, Sliver and the Ke3chang group.

The episode "Harden Azure AD Connect Against Hybrid Identity Breaches" (2025-11-03) places the golden ticket attack among several prevalent methods used against hybrid identity environments. It names it alongside credential theft, where phishing emails or malicious software are used to steal user credentials, and the DCSync attack, in which cybercriminals mimic a domain controller to request password data from other domain controllers. The episode groups these because each leads to unauthorized access, and it notes that such attacks can have severe consequences.

Containment and prevention follow from how the attack works. The MITRE ATT&CK page recommends resetting the KRBTGT password twice, with replication between the two resets, so that older keys can no longer validate forged tickets. It also suggests rotating the KRBTGT password roughly every 180 days. A second mitigation is limiting domain admin rights to domain controllers and a small set of servers, which reduces the chance that an attacker can reach a domain controller and dump the hash in the first place.

Detection relies on spotting tickets or requests that do not match normal Kerberos behavior. The documented indicators include abnormal ticket lifetimes, unexpected encryption types such as RC4 in modern domains, malformed logon fields, and service ticket requests that have no preceding TGT request. Because forged tickets are created offline rather than issued by the KDC, the absence of the usual authentication sequence is one of the more telling signs.

In hybrid identity discussions, the golden ticket attack matters because it targets the foundation of on-premises Active Directory trust. Hardening connected components such as Azure AD Connect, controlling privileged access to domain controllers, and maintaining a routine KRBTGT rotation schedule are the measures the sources associate with reducing exposure.

Overview compiled with AI from M365.FM episodes and the facts on this page. You can improve it with the edit button below.

TypeConcept

Frequently asked questions

Questions marked with AI were written with AI from the facts on this page.

What does a golden ticket attack require? (AI)

It requires the password hash of the KRBTGT account, which is typically obtained through OS credential dumping and needs privileged access to a domain controller.

How can a golden ticket be contained? (AI)

MITRE ATT&CK recommends resetting the KRBTGT password twice with replication between the resets, rotating it roughly every 180 days, and limiting domain admin rights to domain controllers and a small set of servers.

How can golden ticket activity be detected? (AI)

Indicators include abnormal ticket lifetimes, unexpected encryption types such as RC4 in modern domains, malformed logon fields, and service ticket requests without a preceding ticket-granting ticket request.

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Maintained by Mirko Peters (Microsoft MVP) · Last updated: